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Cooperativeness is a defining feature of human nature. Theoreticians have suggested several mechanisms to
explain this ubiquitous phenomenon, including reciprocity, reputation, and punishment, but the problem is
still unsolved. Here we show, through experiments conducted with groups of people playing an iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma on a dynamic network, that it is reputation what really fosters cooperation. While this
mechanism has already been observed in unstructured populations, we find that it acts equally when
interactions are given by a network that players can reconfigure dynamically. Furthermore, our observations
reveal thatmemory also drives the network formation process, and cooperators assortmore, with longer link
lifetimes, the longer the past actions record. Our analysis demonstrates, for the first time, that reputation
can be very well quantified as a weighted mean of the fractions of past cooperative acts and the last action
performed. This finding has potential applications in collaborative systems and e-commerce.
H
uman life would be inconceivable without the high levels of cooperation that our species is capable of1–3.
Our complex society strongly relies on this defining and intrinsic feature of our nature. The study of
human cooperation is often framed in the stylized, strict form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, a situationwhich is
vulnerable to exploitation by free riders. It is well established that, in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games, the
global cooperation level rapidly decays down to values around 10%4,5. In order to explain how this effect is
circumvented in social interactions, several mechanisms have been proposed that allow cooperators to assort and
avoid free riders. Reciprocity6, reputation7, or punishment8,9 are prototypical. Somewhat less obvious is network
reciprocity10, a mechanism that has attracted a lot of interest motivated by the increasing importance of networks
in social research. Thismechanism enhances the assortment of cooperators by limiting interactions to one’s social
neighbours (see Ref. 11 for a review). However, recent experiments with human subjects revealed that simply
structuring a population is not enough to foster and sustain cooperation, no matter the underlying social
network12–16. The reason is that individuals do not base their decision on payoffs17, but behave with their
neighbours just as they do in public good games on groups—cooperating conditionally on the number of
cooperative acts they receive18 as well as on their own previous action15–17,19. This inevitably leads to the decay
of cooperation irrespective of the underlying network structure20.
To be more specific, the networks used in the above experiments are static, predefined structures on which
individuals are constrained to interact. Similar experiments have been carried out with dynamic networks, where
individuals are allowed to change their social ties as they play. The latter mechanism is able to induce and sustain
high levels of cooperation21–24 (note that in Ref. 21 players choose independent actions for every partner, opposite
to all other experiments). Dynamic rewiring introduces a mechanism for punishment, namely to break links as a
response to defective partners, and indeed, it has been found that the promotion of cooperation depends on the
rate at which connections can be modified22,23. However, an important point which seems to have been over-
looked is that in all cases participants received, to some extent, information on their opponents’ past actions, and
therefore, the possibility that it is this information that is driving the rise of cooperation can not be excluded.
Experiments. To address this issue, we conducted 24 experiments involving 243 participants distributed in
groups of between 17 and 25 individuals. Initially, participants in any of the experiments were randomly
assigned to the nodes of a ring with links to nearest and next-nearest neighbours. Sub-sequently, they were
allowed to change their ties along the experiment. The game consisted of 25 rounds (although this number was
unknown to the participants). Each round had two phases. In phase one, each participant played a multi-player
Prisoner’s Dilemma with all participants she was linked to (neighbours) by choosing one action: cooperate (C) or
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defect (D). The payoff they obtained was proportional to the number
nC of neighbours who chose C: if they cooperated they received 7nC
points, whereas if they defected they received 10nC points. These
payoffs correspond to the same payoff matrix used in previous
experiments with fixed networks15,16, and were so chosen for the
sake of comparison. In phase two, they were allowed to break any
of their current ties and to propose up to five new ones with
participants they were not yet linked to (this is the protocol used
in Ref. 23). To make their decisions they were informed of a certain
number (m 5 0, 1, 3, 5) of past actions of every participant in the
experiment (henceforth referred to as ‘‘memory’’). In the case of
memory m 5 0, nothing identified the participants, not even those
they were connected with (i.e., they knew nC but not who among
their neighbours cooperated or defected). At the end of phase two, all
participants decided whether to accept or reject each received
proposal for a new link. Every participant ran two (and only two)
consecutive sessions with different values of m. (For further details
see Supplementary Information).
Our results establish clearly that reputation governs the way indi-
viduals change their ties and, as a consequence, cooperation can be
sustained, but only when information on others’ past actions is avail-
able. We have also found that people assign reputation to partners
based mainly on their last action and their average cooperation.
Thus, the results of this study suggest that, in e-commerce and
related contexts, adding information on the last action performed
to the usual practice of providing the average reliability as a proxy for
reputation could largely enhance trust and transaction efficiency.
Results
The outcome of the experiments run without memory (m 5 0) is in
stark contrast with that of the experiments run withmemory (m. 0)
(Figure 1). Without information on the past actions of other players,
cooperation decays from about 50% down to around 20% and the
average connectivity of players grows quickly toward a saturation
value close to 85% of all possible links. When some past actions
record is available, the level of cooperation remains roughly constant
along the experiment at a value around 50–60%, and the connectivity
grows more slowly. After a short transient, growth is almost linear
(showing no sign of saturation), reaching a final connectivity close to
60%. Moreover, the cases of m 5 3 and m 5 5 are statistically
indistinguishable and the level of cooperation for m 5 1 is slightly
lower (about 50%) than for m . 1 (about 60%). The connectivity is
however very similar except for the short transient, where it remains
below that of m . 1.
In the absence of memory, given that linking with a defector bears
no cost, increasing connectivity as much as possible is the rational
strategy because that maximizes the number of cooperative neigh-
bours. This explains the behaviour shown in Figure 1B. The differ-
ence between the resulting network and a complete graph is likely
due to a fraction of punishing actions from some cooperators who
tried to cut their ties with defecting neighbours. However, this
amount of punishment is insufficient to sustain cooperation, and
the level of cooperation undergoes a ‘tragedy of the commons’ similar
to that observed in fixed networks15,16.
The rational linking strategy is the same when the past actions
record comes in, and the number of links indeed increases with
rounds (Figure 1B). However, this trend is counterbalanced by the
punishing of defectors, as players attempt to break ties with them
while maximizing the number of links with highly cooperative indi-
viduals (Figures 1C and Supplementary Figures 1 to 3). This indir-
ectly forces individuals to cooperatemore, thus increasing the overall
level of cooperation (Figure 1A). At the end of the 25 rounds of the
experiment the total number of links is still increasing, so presumably
the final connectivity and cooperation level would have been much
higher had the experiment lasted longer.
Looking deeper into the differences between the case m 5 0 and
the other three cases sheds more light into the experimental observa-
tions, in particular when the linking dynamics is examined in detail.
To this end, we include in Table 1 a number of magnitudes that serve
the purpose of illustrating player’s behaviour in the four different
treatments studied in the experiments. As we have already men-
tioned, the Table shows the differences in the levels of cooperation
and average connectivity, but other relevant features can be observed.
In particular:
(a) The average number of link proposals shows little variation
between m 5 0 and m 5 1, and decreases for m . 1.
(b) The average number of link proposals that are accepted shows a
strong decreasing trend upon increasing m.
(c) The average number of broken links increases fromm5 0 tom
5 1, and then decreases form. 1—quite abruptly fromm 5 1
to m 5 3.
(d) The average number of rounds along which a link persists
before it is broken decreases from m 5 0 to m 5 1, and then
increases for m . 1—quite abruptly from m 5 1 to m 5 3.
Note, however, that for this magnitude the large values of the
standard deviation in Table 1 do not allow to statistically con-
firm this intuition.
Observations about the level of cooperation and average connec-
tivity, along with items (b), and (c) above are all clear indications that
memory has a strong effect on players’ behaviour, i.e., it functions as
reputation. Thus, cooperation can only be sustained if players can
punish defectors by breaking their ties with them, hence cooperation
is higher when the past actions of players are known. On the other
hand, whereas in all cases increasing the number of links to its max-
imum possible is the rational behaviour (linking with defectors is
costless), connectivity dramatically drops fromm 5 0 tom. 0 as an
effect of the above mentioned punishment. Besides, the longer the
past actions record (memory) the fewer link proposals are accepted
(observation b) and the more links are broken (observation c), again
an effect of punishment. The weak dependence of link proposals with
m (a) is probably associated to the fact that proposing links is free and
can only be beneficial. Nevertheless, it slightly decreases with m
probably due to a self-censoring effect. Surprisingly though, the
average number of proposals is significantly below the five proposals
limit that players had, even for m 5 0. We thus see that reputation,
assigned by players using the information they have in the different
setups, is likely to be an important driver, if not the most important
one, of players’ behaviour.
Indeed, further insight on the way reputation influences rewiring
can be obtained by analyzing the fraction of link proposals which are
accepted as a function of the proponent’s past actions (Figure 2).
These data provide two important pieces of information. On the
one hand, they show that the fraction of accepted links increases
monotonically with the number of cooperative actions in the past
actions record. On the other hand, by sorting the fractions of
accepted links in increasing order, we can observe (Figures 2A and
B) that those whose past actions record is identified by the same value
of just two features—that is, the last action and the same fraction of
cooperative actions—cluster together. Accordingly, we can define a
reputation for every player with a single measure, namely an average
of these two features. The value of the relative weight of the fraction
of cooperative actions in the player’s record (referred to as w in the
Methods section below) can be obtained through a linear fit to the
fractions of accepted link proposals as shown in Figures 2C and D
(see Methods; see also Supplementary Information for further
details). That these two features are the only information about past
behaviour that subjects seem to be using tomake their decisions is an
important outcome of these experiments—particularly useful for
future modeling and for practical applications. The existence of a
reputation-based punishment induces high reputation values among
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Figure 1 | The level of cooperation is significantly higher when the past actions record of players to whom to connect is available. (A): Level of
cooperation (fraction of cooperative actions) per round, averaged over all experiments for the same treatment (memory m 5 0, 1, 3, 5). (B): Average
connectivity (ratio of actual links to potential links) per round, averaged over all experiments for the same treatment. Equivalently, fraction of links of the
actual graph with respect to the complete graph. In both, (A) and (B), error bars represent plus/minus one standard deviation of a binomial distribution
over the size of the treatment concerned and the number of analyzed rounds. (C): Representation of the connectivity graphs resulting from experiments
with 25 participants for all four treatments. Node areas are proportional to their degrees at that round. Node colors represent the cooperation level
(fraction of cooperative actions) up to that round. (We will show below that level of cooperation is an important part of reputation.) Link widths are
proportional to their persistence (number of rounds they have been present). Although represented differently for the sake of consistency, the initial
condition is, in all four cases, topologically equivalent to a ring where each node is linked to its first and second neighbours.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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players (Figure 3), which in turn translates into a higher level of
cooperation than rational behaviour would lead to.
The dynamics of links in the presence of reputation (m. 0) is also
interesting (withoutmemory, formation and breaking of ties is basic-
ally random). Figure 3A shows that links hardly last longer than,10
rounds, their average lifetime being 2.75 (m 5 1), 3.21 (m 5 3), and
3.23 (m 5 5) rounds. At first this looks at odds with a reputation-
driven linking. However, two elements can easily explain this beha-
viour. Figure 3B and C show that, for m 5 3, most subjects exhibit
two cooperative actions in their memory record, and form 5 5, this
number is in the range 2–4. This implies that even individuals who
try to keep a high reputation often defect (Supplementary Figure 9
shows that hardly anyone cooperates formore than 10 times in a row,
and most people typically cooperate no longer than 2 or 3 times in a
row). From our finding that reputation strongly depends on the last
action performed, this means that a high fraction of these defective
actions will cause a serious damage to the subject’s reputation and
triggers the breaking of some ties. The increasing lifetime of links
Table 1 | Memory influences cooperation and network dynamics. Some magnitudes illustrating cooperativeness and link dynamics, as
obtained in the experiments averaging over players, rounds, and games for each treatment (for lifetimes, links existing at the beginning, or
remaining at the end, of the experiment are left out of the estimate). Numbers in parenthesis represent the standard deviation and, as can be
seen, are of the order of a few percents or less for all quantities except for the mean lifetime of links.
treatment (memory) m 5 0 m 5 1 m 5 3 m 5 5
fraction of cooperative actions 0.239 (0.0080) 0.492 (0.0094) 0.576 (0.0087) 0.588 (0.0087)
fraction of links at the end 0.848 (0.049) 0.610 (0.054) 0.613 (0.064) 0.611 (0.054)
proposed links per round and player 3.639 (0.053) 3.853 (0.044) 3.209 (0.041) 2.987 (0.040)
accepted links per round and player 0.791 (0.020) 0.613 (0.014) 0.486 (0.010) 0.459 (0.011)
broken links per round and player 1.145 (0.035) 1.605 (0.025) 0.879 (0.018) 0.835 (0.019)
mean lifetime of links (rounds) 2.750 (1.18) 2.181 (1.07) 3.209 (1.26) 3.232 (1.23)
Figure 2 | Reputation is a weighted combination of average cooperation and last action, and it strongly conditions linking. If the fraction of link
proposals accepted from a proponent with a given past actions record are sorted in increasing order, those corresponding to past actions records sharing
the last action (Clast) and the fraction of cooperative actions (C) are statistically indistinguishable. This holds both for memory m 5 3 (A) and
memory m 5 5 (B). (Labels nC |X denote memory records with last action X and n cooperative previous actions.) This implies that the reputation that
players are taking into account is a weighted combination of Clast and C, i.e., r~wClastz 1{wð ÞC. The value of w can be obtained through a linear fit to
the fractions of accepted link proposals as a function of r (C andD; seeMethods and Supplementary Information for details). The results arew5 0.2806
0.024 form5 3 andw5 0.1656 0.015 form5 5. Notice that the weight form5 5 can be obtained from the observation (B) that the fraction of accepted
proposals for past action records 3C |D is statistically indistinguishable from that for past action records 1C |C. This implies (1 2 w)(3/5) 5 (1 2 w)(2/5)
1 w, i.e., w 5 1/6 (compare with the value obtained through the linear fit).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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observed asm increases is therefore consistent with the correspond-
ing lower weight that the last action has in the quantitative measure
of reputation (in other words, defections are less damaging to repu-
tation the larger m). This suggests that keeping full history records
could make ties highly persistent.
Discussion
To summarize, our experiments show that the punishingmechanism
implicit in the network plasticity requires knowledge of the partner’s
reputation in order to work as a cooperation driver. Otherwise,
rewiring simply leads to cooperation levels similar to those found
in rigid networks. This conclusion aligns nicely with the experi-
mental observation that good reputation and having more social
supporting partners are correlated25.
Compared to previous experiments with a similar setup23, the
significantly lower level of cooperation we observe in ours is striking.
The most relevant difference in the experimental conditions is the
different payoff matrix: in Ref. 23 players played a true prisoner’s
dilemma (defector’s payoff is higher than cooperator’s when con-
fronted to a defector) whereas in our experiments they played a weak
prisoner’s dilemma (both payoffs are equal). In static networks, this
has the effect of decreasing the level of cooperation17. Paradoxically,
in dynamic networks it may have the opposite effect. The reason is
that, with a defective neighbour, cooperating or defecting makes no
difference in a weak prisoner’s dilemma, whereas cooperating with a
defective partner is costly in a true prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, players
who are prone to cooperate need to break ties with all their defective
neighbours to increase their payoff. Because of this strong punish-
ment, players have more incentives to cooperate than to defect,
which rises the global level of cooperation.
Interestingly, aside form the impact of reputation in cooperation,
our results also shed light on the mechanisms that drive network
formation. As shown here, the reconfiguration of the underlying net-
work at any given time is greatly influenced by the cooperative repu-
tation of players. This is a new feature that has not been taken into
account in network formation models proposed so far, except for a few
cases26,27 in which network growth is coupled to an evolutionary
dynamics—albeit in a different way, and limited to one step memory.
Therefore, there is much research to be done along these lines: relevant
open questions include finding the outcome of evolutionary network
growth when memory lasts longer, how this relates to the duration and
pace of evolution, and the extension to the case when the number of
subjects in the network can vary (i.e., the number of players is not fixed
and can increase or decrease). We think that theoretical or experi-
mental efforts aimed at tackling these questions could shed further
light on how human societies and organizations arise and evolve.
Finally, we stress that a very important outcome of our experi-
mental results is that they provide convincing evidence that repu-
tation is based on just two features of past actions records: the
fraction of cooperative actions and the last action performed. This
fact and the strong effect that the last action has on trust—revealed by
the fast turnover dynamics observed in the experiments—do not
seem to have been sufficiently acknowledged before. Reputation, in
the way we have characterized it, appears to be used for interactions
with a moderate number of possible partners; situations with very
many options may lead to further simplifications in the relation
between memory and reputation, while others with few candidate
partners may allow to retain the whole sequence of actions to form a
reputation. A particularly interesting context where reputation, as
observed here, plays such an important role is e-commerce28, as the
number of possible partners at any given time is typically in the
intermediate range we are considering here. At the time of writing,
we are not aware of any platform where information on the last
transaction of agents is provided along with the percentage of ful-
filled past transactions. Our experiments suggest that this could have
a strong effect in enforcing well-behaving commercial practice
through the promotion of reputation-based trust.
Methods
Ethics statement. All participants in the experiments reported in the manuscript
signed an informed consent to participate. Besides, their anonymity was always
Figure 3 | Subjects try to hold a high reputation but not the highest. The histogram of link lifetimes shows a fast exponential decay (A; average lifetimes
are 2.75 rounds for m 5 1, 3.21 for m 5 3, and 3.23 for m 5 5). This is a consequence of the fact that most individuals keep a record of 2 cooperative
actions out of 3 (B) or 2–4 out of 5 (C); in other words, subjects often defect but not too much—that would ruin their reputation. But this sporadic
defection has a drastic effect on the linking dynamics because reputation is very much influenced by subjects’ last action.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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preserved (in agreement with the Spanish Law for Personal Data Protection) by
assigning them randomly a username which would identify them in the system. No
association was ever made between their real names and the results. As it is standard
in socio-economic experiments, no ethic concerns are involved other than preserving
the anonymity of participants. This procedure was checked and approved by the
Viceprovost of Research of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the institution
responsible for the funding for the experiment. The experiment was subsequently
carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines.
Participants were recruited from the volunteer pool of the Experimental
Economics Lab of the Departamento de Economı´a of Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid, where experiments were also conducted. The volunteer pool is open to
students enrolled at the University at any degree and level, including postgraduate
studies, and the possibility to join the pool was reminded to the students through the
University mailing list for the experiment. In every session, participants were initially
linked to four other players and then allowed to connect to anybody in the session, i.e.,
every session was a unique group. Each group participated in two treatments in a row.
Sessions were conducted on June 5 and 6, 2013, with groups of 17, 23, 24 and two of 25
participants for them 5 0,1 treatments, and on September 26 and 27 and October 25,
28 and 31, with groups of 18, 19, two of 21 and two of 25 participants for them 5 3,5
treatments. Half on the groups performed the experiments in an order and the other
half in the opposite order. The specific order has some effect in the results (especially
in the links lifetime for m 5 0), but it has a small or null influence on the relevant
observables. The total number of participants was 243 and the total cost of the
experiment was around 6000 J. Detailed instructions (see Supplementary
Information) were both read aloud at the beginning of the experiment and provided
in a written document that participants kept until the end of it. After each session
participants were informed of the amount of money they had won and immediately
paid. Typical earnings ranged 15–30 euros, including a 5 euros show-up fee.
Experiments were carried out on a web-based platform (see Supplementary
Information) and results gathered in a database for further analysis. Individuals
played anonymously and could not interact during the experiment. Participants
anonymity was always guaranteed and data collected in a way that their authors could
never be traced.
Defining reputation as r~wCz 1{wð ÞClast , where C is the fraction of cooperative
actions in the past actions record, and Clast is the last action (1 if it is cooperation, 0
otherwise), and the dependence A(r) 5 a 1 br of the fraction of accepted links as a
function of reputation, thenA rð Þ~azb1Czb2Clast , where b1 5 bw and b2 5 b(12
w). Coefficients a,b1,b2 are obtained through a least squares linear fit of this
expression to the data, and w is determined from them as w 5 b1/(b1 1 b2).
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